China’s most recent national security white paper opens with a striking hierarchy, putting people’s security first, political security second and economic security third. That ordering is deliberate.
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For years, Western observers have asked what China wants. Does Beijing aim to dominate Asia, displace the United States or rewrite the international order? Entire books and essays have been devoted to the question. However, the more revealing question is different: what does China need?
Wants are preferences. Needs are constraints. If needs are unmet, they threaten the Communist Party’s legitimacy. Diplomacy is always a two-level game: leaders negotiate abroad but must deliver stability at home. In democracies, that means persuading voters; in China, it means sustaining growth, food and energy security and social order.
Seen through this lens, China’s actions abroad look less like unbounded ambition and more like risk management for regime survival. Recognising this logic does not excuse coercion, but it does highlight where China is most vulnerable and where policy leverage lies.
For four decades, economic growth has been the party’s social contract. President Xi Jinping has rebranded it as the “Chinese dream” and the “dual circulation” strategy, stressing resilience at home while diversifying abroad. Even so, economic growth is slowing. Export controls on semiconductors are seen not as routine competition but as existential threats. That explains Beijing’s push for indigenous innovation and reduced dependence on the West.
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Energy reliance deepens the pressure, with China importing about 70 per cent of its oil. A supply shock could choke growth and legitimacy with it. Hence the hedges such as pipelines from Russia and Myanmar, long-term natural gas deals with Qatar and vast investments in renewable energy. To outsiders, these might look mercantilist. To Beijing, they are life insurance.