Washington Should Not Forget Who To Lam Is

As this article is being written, the dual-hatted General Secretary and President To Lam is in New York to attend the commencement of the United Nations National Assembly (UNGA)—an event that draws world leaders together. It was also announced at the last minute that he is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of UNGA after what appears to be a long lobbying process from Lam’s team.

Immediately before Lam’s U.S. trip, Vietnam released two prominent political prisoners, democracy activist Tran Huynh Duy Thuc and environmentalist Hoang Thi Minh Hong, an Obama scholar at Columbia University, the same institution where To Lam gave a speech this week. While the West has witnessed and not questioned Lam’s path in rising to power, it is important to remember him for who he is: an authoritarian leader who happens to understand the importance of bringing American dollars to Vietnam.

Troubled Rise to Power

The past six months have been unforgettable for the now-most powerful man in Vietnam. After a long tenure as the head of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the career cop rose to the rank of president after former President Vo Van Thuong resigned over alleged corruption. Despite taking over a symbolic role, it was clear that To Lam had his eyes on the final prize: the general secretary position, the de facto most powerful in Vietnam.

In his previous position as minister of public security, To Lam arguably bore the most responsibility for the surveillance and detention of peaceful political dissidents. In a previous piece, I argued that the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s fixation on anti-corruption paved the way for the consolidation of MPS’s power. Under To Lam’s tenure, Vietnam saw the rapid shrinking of its already-tiny space for non-government organizations, especially after the closure of several environmental NGOs over bogus tax evasion charges.

To Lam was not just intimidating to those deemed to be outside of the party establishment – he was brutal to the people in the system, too.

Alongside the late general secretary, To Lam was also responsible for the crackdown on high-level government officials who threatened his ascendance to power in the name of anti-corruption. In the first six months of this year alone, half of Vietnam’s powerful “four pillars” were removed from their positions, in addition to the fifth highest-ranking permanent member of the Secretariat, Truong Thi Mai, and countless other deputies and ministers.

If To Lam seemingly has little regard for those working for the government—his own peers—why would he listen to those outside of it, regardless of how much money they could bring into the country?

Ushering in Changes or the Same Old Playbook?

Despite this blood-soaked resumé, the West has acquiesced mainly to To Lam’s climb to power due to his affinity for the business community. In his first few weeks in office, To Lam publicly affirmed that his anti-corruption campaign would not hinder economic development. Lam is scheduled to meet with major U.S. corporations, including Google, Meta, and Marvell, during his trip to the United States. 

This new emphasis on bringing business – especially American businesses – into Vietnam is remarkably different from his Marxist predecessor, who hyper-fixated on the longevity of the Communist system in an era that desperately needed new thinking.

To Lam’s dual-hatted position might have raised some alarms from international observers, who are rightfully concerned that he has consolidated power to become a Xi Jinping-style authoritarian. In late August, however, the National Assembly announced it would vote on a new president in October, signaling that To Lam will likely step down from the symbolic presidency.

We will likely never know whether To Lam did so out of his own volition or due to behind-the-scenes political infighting. However, it is clear that he cares about what Western observers think about him and his government, which is important for the country’s economic development. This concern was so important that the Vietnamese authorities decided to release two prominent political prisoners ahead of his U.S. visit to send a message to Washington that To Lam listened.

However, Washington needs to remember that we have seen this film before. Historically, the Vietnamese government has always had a vicious cycle of releasing prisoners ahead of important bilateral events with the U.S., to go back to its oppressive ways immediately after. 

In addition to his packed schedule, To Lam was also invited to give a speech at Columbia University, likely at the invitation of Fulbright University Chairman Thomas Vallely and Columbia Professor Lien-Hang Nguyen. The scene of a paramount leader taking questions on an American university campus at the invitation of a Vietnamese-American professor is almost surreal. After all, this never happened under Nguyen Phu Trong.

But Washington should not consider this a definitive sign that Vietnam is liberalizing for good. It will take constant pressure from the U.S. State Department—and potentially the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative—to remind this new generation of leaders that a few isolated incidents of opening up are not good enough to sustain a trust-worthy relationship with the United States.

It is easy to get caught up in the momentum of U.S.-Vietnam relations, which were significantly elevated due to the ongoing U.S. trade war with China. However, because To Lam is not Xi Jinping, it does not mean he cannot become one.

  1. Hunnicutt, T. (2024, September 23). Biden to meet Vietnamese president on Wednesday, White House says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-expected-meet-vietnamese-president-wednesday-source-says-2024-09-22/
  2. Huong Giang. (2024, August 14). Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước: Không vì đẩy mạnh chống tham nhũng mà cản trở phát triển kinh tế. Thanh Tra. https://thanhtra.com.vn/phong-chong-tham-nhung/tin-tuc/tong-bi-thu-chu-tich-nuoc-khong-vi-day-manh-chong-tham-nhung-ma-can-tro-phat-trien-kinh-te-229453.html
  3. Nguyen, S. (2024, July 30). Nguyen Phu Trong’s ultimate endgame: grooming a police strongman as his successor. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2024/07/nguyen-phu-trongs-ultimate-endgame-grooming-a-police-strongman-as-his-successor-2/
  4. The Vietnamese Magazine. (2024, September 23). Vietnam releases prominent political dissident Tran Huynh Duy Thuc and environmental activist Hoang Thi Minh Hong before To Lam’s trip to U.S. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2024/09/vietnam-releases-prominent-political-dissident-tran-huynh-duy-thuc-and-environmental-activist-hoang-thi-minh-hong-before-to-lams-trip-to-u-s/
  5. Vietnam+. (2024a, August 26). National Assembly to elect new State President in October: Official. Vietnam+ (VietnamPlus). https://en.vietnamplus.vn/national-assembly-to-elect-new-state-president-in-october-official-post292549.vnp
  6. Vietnam+. (2024b, September 23). Vietnam’s top leader visits, delivers policy speech at Columbia University. Vietnam+ (VietnamPlus). https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnams-top-leader-visits-delivers-policy-speech-at-columbia-university-post297065.vnp