Việt Nam’s criminal justice system continues to target senior officials, as news of arrests and indictments fills the government’s own legal policy portals. [1]
Among the latest is Nguyễn Văn Bình, head of the Legal Department at the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs, who has been charged with “deliberately disclosing state secrets.” Beyond brief initial reports and vague legal citations, [2] the public has no idea what “secrets” were leaked, nor how the act was deemed deliberate.
This suggests that Việt Nam is moving against the regional trend toward open government. [3] Furthermore, the use of criminal law to punish officials has strayed from the socialist orientation, in which the rights of workers in a market economy are meant to be protected. [4] In doing so, the state has violated a fundamental principle: criminal law should be used to safeguard labor rights, not to suppress them. [5]
Every sovereign state protects national security, which includes classifying certain information as secret. However, any national security law must balance state interests with civil liberties. [6]
This is the focus of the Tshwane Principles, which state that secrecy must serve a legitimate public interest and preserve the public’s right to access information. These principles were developed by over 500 experts from more than 70 countries. [7] The guidelines also address modern issues, such as managing big data for national security. [8]
This framework relies on judicial oversight: when disputes arise over government secrecy, it is the courts that determine if the measures taken were reasonable. [9] Under such an approach, national security laws are properly designed to prevent acts of espionage or terrorism.
Việt Nam has two separate laws addressing secrecy: the Law on Protection of State Secrets and the Cybersecurity Law. The Law on Protection of State Secrets presents general principles and borrows from international practice, such as recognizing the right to access information and using a tiered classification system: top secret, highly secret, secret.
Despite these influences, the law’s most crucial concept—what constitutes a state secret and its relationship to national security—remains undefined. This results in vague and illogical provisions that lack clear enforcement procedures. [10] The law is broadly shaped by Việt Nam’s wartime history, its longstanding fear of foreign interference, its demands for loyalty to the Communist Party, [11] and its imitation of the former Soviet bureaucratic model.
A subsequent decree from the Prime Minister, listing state secrets in labor and social affairs, exemplifies this. It classifies “reports and documents assessing complex situations relating to the establishment and operation of workers’ organizations at enterprises that may affect national security or public order” as secret. [12] This regulation reflects a naïve assumption that the formation or operation of workers’ organizations inherently pose a threat to national security. [13]
Such reasoning directly counters the efforts of experts working to improve labor conditions and workers’ livelihoods through trade liberalization [14]. Historical challenges cannot justify such outdated and irrational policies on state secrecy or on workers’ organizations promoted by the Communist Party and the Vietnamese government.
Labor Rights and Việt Nam’s International Commitments
Labor rights in Việt Nam are complex, shaped by historical ruptures from colonialism and war to globalization. This is reflected in Việt Nam’s relationship with the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is divided into three phases:
- 1950–1976 (under the Republic of Việt Nam);
- 1980–1985 (a brief rejoin and withdrawal); and
- 1992 to the present (as part of global trade integration). [15]
In line with this integration, Việt Nam has ratified 25 international labor conventions, [16] including Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. [17] This was a key commitment under agreements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA).
However, ratification alone has not guaranteed genuine progress. Trade partners have expressed concern that Việt Nam is backsliding by delaying the establishment of enterprise-level workers’ organizations. [18]
This delay contradicts the task of a modern state: to provide transparent labor governance and build an enabling regulatory environment that protects labor rights while promoting economic growth [19]—not to punish individuals. This is also the ideal of socialism, in which all citizens are equal in access to opportunity.
Trade Unions and Worker Representation
The Việt Nam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is a product of history, born from anti-colonial struggles. [20] Over time, however, it has evolved into a quasi-governmental body rather than a genuine trade union representing workers. [21]
This is clear in its focus. The official rhetoric of “taking care of workers’ legitimate interests” (like visits or financial assistance) [22] is not the same as protecting “labor rights”—such as the right to work in safe conditions, earn a living wage, and bargain collectively.
This distinction matters because workers are inherently the weaker party in relation to employers. A state should create conditions to balance this power dynamic, which improves both productivity and competitiveness. Allowing genuine worker representative organizations at the enterprise level is key to that strategy.
Moreover, the VGCL is not a member of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). [23] In its absence, the ITUC has repeatedly spoken out to defend Vietnamese workers, particularly in foreign-invested enterprises. Before the EVFTA negotiations, ITUC criticized European companies for “exporting poverty wages to Việt Nam.” [24] In 2018, it sent a letter to the South Korean President denouncing Samsung’s human-rights and labor-rights violations in Việt Nam. [25]
Neither the VGCL nor the domestic press reported on these incidents. According to experts, the state apparatus has instead cooperated with capital interests to maintain exploitative labor conditions. [26]
This situation is reflected in the 2023 ITUC Global Rights Index, where Việt Nam received a score of 4 (“systematic violations”), near the worst possible rating of 5. [27] The report noted that while abuses occur in developed economies—such as Canada or Australia—in Việt Nam, they are systemic and institutionalized.
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The law is being used for the wrong purpose: criminal provisions are applied to punish individuals, not to hold corporations accountable for labor-rights violations.
This is exacerbated by vague, poorly defined regulations on state secrets in the labor sector. These rules do not improve labor governance or enhance national security; they merely create additional obstacles for the government itself.
By clinging to rigid notions of loyalty over expanding the legal framework for equality, the system ultimately risks turning any civil servant into a potential target of criminal punishment.
Thúy Hường wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 7, 2024. J. Miu translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
[1] See: https://xaydungchinhsach.chinhphu.vn/khoi-to-bat-tam-giam-vu-truong-119240509100410532.htm
[3] See: https://www.undp.org/vietnam/blog/people-centric-and-open-government-key-developing-inclusive-and-digital-government; https://opengovasia.com
[4] Australia’s Labor government has moved to protect workers’ rights by making wage theft—the act of employers stealing workers’ pay—a criminal offense. See: https://ministers.dewr.gov.au/burke/albanese-labor-government-criminalise-wage-theft
[5] Barnard, Catherine, and Sarah Fraser Butlin, ‘Where Criminal Law Meets Labour Law: The Effectiveness of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Labour Rights’, in Alan Bogg, and others (eds), Criminality at Work (Oxford, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 Apr. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198836995.003.0004
[6] See National Security Law, 7th Edition, William C. Banks (2020), Aspen Publishing; https://rm.coe.int/168067d214
[8] Babak Akhgar, Gregory B. Saathoff, Hamid R Arabnia, Richard Hill, Andrew Staniforth, Petra Saskia Bayerl (2015), Application of Big Data for National Security: A Practitioner’s Guide to Emerging Technologies.
[9] See: https://rm.coe.int/168067d214
[10] Article 3(2) stipulates that protecting state secrets is the responsibility of every individual. This naturally raises questions: Why is each person held accountable for this duty? And how exactly is one expected to fulfill it?
[11] Many scholars and rights organizations have commented on Directive 24 of the Communist Party, which views the formation of independent labor organizations as a potential threat to national security. See:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/1/vietnam-orders-control-of-workers-unions-despite-un-pledges-watchdog-says; /https://www.scribd.com/document/709660092/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Politburo-Issues-Directive-24-on-National-Security
[12] Decision No. 1451/QĐ-TTg (2020), dated September 24, 2020.
[13] The issue of labor relations and wildcat strikes in Việt Nam has been the subject of extensive study by both Vietnamese and international scholars over the past four decades. Their research has been widely published. See:
- Wolff, P. (1999). Vietnam – The Incomplete Transformation (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003243465;
- Lee, C.-H. (2006). Recent Industrial Relations Developments in China and Viet Nam: The Transformation of Industrial Relations in East Asian Transition Economies. Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(3), 415-429. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022185606064794;
- Cox, A. (2015). The pressure of wildcat strikes on the transformation of industrial relations in a developing country: The case of the garment and textile industry in Vietnam. Journal of Industrial Relations, 57 (2), 271-290;
- Angie Tran, Jennifer Bair and Marion Werner. “Forcing Change from the Outside? The Role of Trade-Labour Linkages in Transforming Vietnam’s Labour Regime” Competition & Change Vol. 21 Iss. 5 (2017) http://works.bepress.com/angie-tran/8/;
- Buckley, J. (2021). Vietnamese Labour Militancy: Capital-labour antagonisms and self-organised struggles (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003177241;
- Sicurelli, D. (2021). The EU as a partner of ILO in trade negotiations. Explaining labour reform in Vietnam. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 30(3), 461–473. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1909544;
- Tu Phuong Nguyen (2021), Workplace Justice: Rights and Labour Resistance in Vietnam;
- Angie Ngọc Trần, Contradictions of Multi-stakeholder Labor Relations in Vietnam in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Vietnam (2022);
- Tu Phuong Nguyen (2023), Law and Precarity: Legal Consciousness and Daily Survival in Vietnam, Cambridge University Press.
[15] See: https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103004
[16] See: https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO
[17] See: https://dangcongsan.vn/xa-hoi/cong-bo-gia-nhap-cong-uoc-so-98-cua-ilo-558654.html
[18] See: https://www.dw.com/en/vietnams-labor-rights-make-two-steps-forward-one-step-back/a-56653076
[19] See: https://betterentrepreneurship.eu/en/guidance-note/guidance-note-legal-and-regulatory-framework
[20] See: http://congdoan.vn/home
[21] See: https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/podcasts/as-vietnam-scales-the-global-value-chain-what-does-it-mean-for-its-workers; Về bản chất, mục đích, chiến lược hoạt động của nghiệp đoàn, xem https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0950017014568142; https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/employment-law/the-importance-of-trade-unions-law-essay.php
[23] See: https://en.vietnamplus.vn/intl-confederation-to-support-vietnam-trade-unions-post101416.vnp
[24] See: https://www.ituc-csi.org/european-multinationals-position
[25] See: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/presidentmoon_ituc200318.pdf
[27] See: https://files.mutualcdn.com/ituc/files/2023_ituc_global_rights_index_en.pdf

