The Vietnam Fatherland Front’s Monopoly on Disaster Relief–Part 3: The People Bear the Costs

The maxim, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” is a cornerstone of investment strategy. It serves as a reminder that portfolios should be diversified to reduce risk; when markets fluctuate, spreading assets prevents a single failure from becoming a total loss.

While charitable giving is not a financial investment, the psychology behind it is remarkably similar. It is an exercise in “choosing where to place one’s trust.” Consequently, the current situation—where the vast majority of public donations flow into a single destination, the Mặt trận Tổ quốc Việt Nam (Vietnam Fatherland Front, VFF) is the charitable equivalent of putting every egg in one basket.

This centralization creates significant anxiety, particularly because the VFF’s use of funds remains highly opaque. However, the dangers of this near-monopoly go beyond the risk of financial mismanagement; the consequences extend much further.

When the door for private charity closes, the public is forced to funnel all resources through a single gatekeeper. Since the issuance of Decree No. 93/2021/NĐ-CP (Decree 93/2021), the landscape for independent relief and voluntary contributions has narrowed significantly. [1] Facing strict regulations, many individuals and volunteer groups have stopped accepting cash, choosing instead to donate goods, pay out of pocket, or simply transfer funds to the VFF.

By funneling resources into a single channel, the system loses the diversity and flexibility crucial for emergency response. Worse, the VFF has become overstretched, while serving as the central hub for receiving relief goods. [2]

The most critical consequence of this monopoly is delay. Unlike private groups, the VFF’s disbursement process is burdened by bureaucracy. Funds must navigate a complex hierarchy: from central reception to allocation planning, then to provincial, district, and finally commune levels.

Floods and storms do not wait for paperwork—but relief funds must wait for every official stamp. Each administrative layer introduces delays, while disaster relief demands speed measured in hours or even minutes, not weeks or months.

This inefficiency explains the staggering gap in the data: despite receiving 3.2 trillion đồng during the latest floods, only 678 billion đồng had been disbursed while victims waited in desperation. [3] The question remains: when will the money actually reach those in need?

Another major concern with the monopoly of the VFF over charitable relief lies in the blurred boundary between two distinct resources: state budget funds allocated for disaster relief and donations mobilized through the Front.

In principle, these are two separate mechanisms governed by different legal frameworks. All funds donated by citizens and organizations through the VFF are socialized resources, not state budget revenue, and therefore are not subject to the Law on the State Budget. [4] However, many people conflate the funds raised by the VFF with the Government’s Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Fund or with state budget allocations earmarked for disaster recovery.

The VFF is constitutionally framed as a quasi-state institution, and state media actively promote its charity drives. It is therefore unsurprising that many people perceive money disbursed by the VFF as state money. Consequently, when receiving relief aid, beneficiaries often habitually—or are reminded to—express gratitude to “the Party and the State.” This perception is reinforced by practice; in many instances, the names of Party and state leaders are attached to donated goods, not the individual citizens whose contributions made those donations possible. [5]

Consider the figures. 

As of November 2025, the state had spent 3.6 trillion đồng over the first ten months of the year to support localities in disaster recovery. [6] Meanwhile, according to incomplete statistics, as of Nov. 24, the VFF had mobilized 3.2 trillion đồng after just over one month of calling on the public for contributions. [7]

Additionally, as of Sept. 20, 2024, local Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Funds had collected 5.925 trillion đồng, disbursed 3.686 trillion đồng, and retained a surplus of 2.263 trillion đồng. [8]

Many citizens have raised questions about the transparency of the Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Fund. [9] But much like the VFF’s finances, the use of these funds is not publicly disclosed in a way that allows for meaningful oversight.

Even so, the figures suggest that funds mobilized by the VFF—within a short time—are nearing the level of state-budget spending. This inevitably creates the impression that the state is relying on charity, which should be a supplementary resource, rather than on proactive public-budget capacity. This is why many ask: “Where is the state’s money? Why does every disaster end with calls for donations?”

Experts have noted that Việt Nam lacks comprehensive data on financial resources for disaster response. [10] At present, the country’s financial capacity reportedly meets only about 21% of the needs for reconstruction and emergency relief. This issue echoes past controversies surrounding the 2021 COVID-19 vaccine fund, where many argued that appeals for contributions reflected a shifting of costs from public finances onto citizens. [11]

Under Article 8 of the Law on the Việt Nam Fatherland Front, the VFF is theoretically supervised by “the people” to ensure that the organization fulfills its rights and responsibilities as prescribed by law. [12] However, without access to detailed data, the public cannot meaningfully perform this function.

The root of the problem lies in the structure of Decree 93/2021. The decree assigns the VFF four conflicting roles: mobilization, receipt, distribution, and supervision—effectively creating a “player and referee” model.

As a result, the risk of opacity in the handling of relief funds becomes increasingly apparent, especially given the unclear disclosure practices. It is evident that the VFF’s current charity operations lack an independent oversight mechanism. This is partly because charitable donations are not part of the state budget and thus fall outside the scope of mandatory public auditing.

Given that the VFF mobilizes sums totaling trillions of đồng each time a disaster strikes, such a lack of transparency is unacceptable. When social resources are funneled into a single channel, delays, opacity, and blurred lines of responsibility easily become burdens borne by ordinary people—both donors and those in need.

The concerns surrounding the concentration of public money in a single organization are not raised to criticize for the sake of criticism, but to press a legitimate demand for transparency and effectiveness. Communal goodwill is invaluable. Only when that flow is safeguarded by accountability can it reach its full potential. Otherwise, even the most sincere intentions risk fading under opaque practices.


Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 3, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

  1. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, January 10). Nghị định 93/2021/NĐ-CP về vận động, tiếp nhận, phân phối và sử dụng các nguồn đóng góp tự nguyện hỗ trợ khắc phục khó khăn do thiên tai, dịch bệnh, sự cố; hỗ trợ bệnh nhân mắc bệnh hiểm nghèo. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Tai-nguyen-Moi-truong/Nghi-dinh-93-2021-ND-CP-phan-phoi-su-dung-nguon-dong-gop-tu-nguyen-ho-tro-thien-tai-dich-benh-460767.aspx
  2. Baotintuc.Vn. (2025, November 24). TP Hồ Chí Minh: Tăng tốc phân phối hàng cứu trợ đến với bà con vùng lũ miền Trung. Copyright © 2020 by baotintuc.vn. https://baotintuc.vn/van-de-quan-tam/tp-ho-chi-minh-tang-toc-phan-phoi-hang-cuu-tro-den-voi-ba-con-vung-lu-mien-trung-20251124140847120.htm
  3. See: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=122111875653033969&set=a.122104180143033969&type=3
  4. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, November 29). Luật ngân sách nhà nước 2025. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Tai-chinh-nha-nuoc/Luat-ngan-sach-nha-nuoc-2025-so-89-2025-QH15-650061.aspx
  5. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2025, November 22). Ủy ban Trung ương MTTQ Việt Nam trao 20 tỷ đồng hỗ trợ Lâm Đồng khắc phục hậu quả mưa lũ. baochinhphu.vn. https://baochinhphu.vn/uy-ban-trung-uong-mttq-viet-nam-trao-20-ty-dong-ho-tro-lam-dong-khac-phuc-hau-qua-mua-lu-102251122152839161.htm
  6. Baodautu.Vn. (n.d.). Ngân sách chi 3.600 tỷ đồng hỗ trợ các địa phương khắc phục bão, mưa lũ. Baodautu. https://baodautu.vn/ngan-sach-chi-3600-ty-dong-ho-tro-cac-dia-phuong-khac-phuc-bao-mua-lu-d436703.html
  7. Hơn 2.088,5 tỷ đồng đăng ký ủng hộ đồng bào khắc phục hậu quả do mưa lũ gây ra qua Ban Vận động Cứu trợ Trung ương. (n.d.). Uỷ Ban Trung Ương Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc Việt Nam. https://mattran.org.vn/hoat-dong/hon-20885-ty-dong-dang-ky-ung-ho-dong-bao-khac-phuc-hau-qua-do-mua-lu-gay-ra-qua-ban-van-dong-cuu-tro-trung-uong-67902.html
  8. Nội, T.-. L. T. K. H. (2024, September 21). Quỹ Phòng, chống thiên tai các địa phương còn gần 2 300 tỷ đồng. https://www.qdnd.vn. https://www.qdnd.vn/kinh-te/tin-tuc/quy-phong-chong-thien-tai-cac-dia-phuong-con-gan-2-300-ty-dong-795427
  9. See: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Bbmy7vzTe/
  10. Việt Nam needs to build a strategy for disaster risk financing and insurance. (n.d.). vietnamnews.vn. https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/1687166/viet-nam-needs-to-build-a-strategy-for-disaster-risk-financing-and-insurance.html
  11. Nguyen, D. (2021, June 29). Vietnam’s unprecedented COVID-19 challenge compounded by a deficit of trust in the government – the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese Magazine. https://www.thevietnamese.org/2021/06/vietnams-unprecedented-covid-19-challenge-compounded-by-a-deficit-of-trust-in-the-government/
  12. Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, November 19). Luật Mặt trận tổ quốc Việt Nam 2015. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Luat-Mat-tran-to-quoc-Viet-Nam-2015-282378.aspx

 

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