Key Events
- Party Central Committee Delays Leadership Decisions;
- Hà Nội’s New Party Chief Signals the Consolidation of Tô Lâm’s Inner Circle;
- Revised Cybersecurity Law Adds Controls, Costs for Firms;
- German Court Limits Vingroup Lawsuit, Rules Most Criticism Protected Speech.
Việt Nam’s Communist Party Fails to Finalize Top Leadership Lineup at 14th Central Committee Meeting
The most significant political event in Việt Nam last week — the 14th Plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee — ended without a final decision on the country’s next top leadership slate, despite earlier expectations that this would be the last meeting before the upcoming Party Congress.
In his closing address, General Secretary Tô Lâm announced that the Central Committee had agreed on the number and list of nominees for the 14th-term Politburo, the Secretariat, and other senior leadership positions. The committee also discussed preparations for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, scheduled for January 19–25, 2026.
However, the party has yet to release any details about how many nominees were approved or who they are. Tô Lâm said the Politburo and the 14th Congress Personnel Subcommittee will continue to refine the personnel plan and submit it to the 15th Plenum for consideration and final approval.
This means that another Central Committee meeting — the 15th — will now need to be convened before the National Congress, though no date has been announced. The decision effectively delays the long-awaited confirmation of Việt Nam’s most powerful political positions, including potential changes to the general secretary, prime minister, president, and chair of the National Assembly.
In July 2025, Tô Lâm indicated that the upcoming 14th Central Committee would likely comprise 200 members — 180 full members and 20 alternates — including 17–19 Politburo members and 11–13 members of the Secretariat.
The Central Committee plenums are critical milestones in Vietnam’s political cycle. Convened every few months, they determine key policy directions and leadership arrangements ahead of each Party Congress, which occurs every five years. The outcomes shape not only the country’s ruling elite but also its political and economic strategies for the next half-decade.
As the 14th Party Congress approaches, the unresolved leadership lineup signals internal debates and delicate power balancing within the Communist Party — a reminder that even in Việt Nam’s tightly controlled political system, consensus at the top is not always guaranteed.
The forthcoming 15th Plenum will now carry heightened significance, as it is expected to finalize the country’s next generation of leaders and set the tone for Việt Nam’s political direction through the late 2020s.
Politburo Appoints General Nguyễn Duy Ngọc as Hà Nội Party Chief Amid Rapid Rise of Hưng Yên Power Bloc
At a ceremony on Nov. 4, Việt Nam’s Politburo announced the appointment of Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyễn Duy Ngọc as the new Hà Nội party secretary, replacing Bùi Thị Minh Hoài, who has been reassigned as party secretary of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and Central Mass Organizations Bloc.
The move marks the rapid ascent of one of Việt Nam’s most prominent emerging political figures — and underscores the growing influence of officials hailing from Hưng Yên, the home province of current General Secretary Tô Lâm.
Nguyễn Duy Ngọc’s career trajectory has been remarkably swift. He previously served as deputy director of Hà Nội’s Police Department and head of the city’s Investigation Agency from 2013 to 2016.
In late 2016, he became deputy general director of the General Department of Police, and soon after, director of the Anti-Corruption, Economic Crimes, and Smuggling Investigation Department (C03) under the Ministry of Public Security.
In December 2023, he was promoted to senior lt. gen. and appointed deputy minister of Public Security. Within two years, Ngọc’s rise accelerated even further: he became chief of the Communist Party’s Central Office in June 2024, was elected a central committee secretary in August, and joined the Politburo in January 2025 as chairman of the party’s Central Inspection Commission — one of the most powerful internal oversight roles in the Vietnamese political system.
Nguyễn Duy Ngọc’s promotion strengthens what observers are calling the “Hưng Yên faction” — a growing network of senior officials who share the same provincial roots as General Secretary Tô Lâm.In recent years, several key figures from Hưng Yên have risen to top positions:
- General Lương Tam Quang, Politburo member and minister of Public Security
- Maj. Gen. Vũ Hồng Văn, party secretary of Đồng Nai
- Senior. Lt. Gen. Hoàng Xuân Chiến, deputy minister of National Defense
- Senior Lt. Gen. Phạm Thế Tùng, deputy minister of Public Security
- Nguyễn Hải Ninh, minister of Justice
- Senior Lt. Gen. Nguyễn Hồng Thái, party secretary of Bắc Ninh
- Đỗ Tiến Sỹ, general director of Voice of Việt Nam
The appointment of Nguyễn Duy Ngọc, following a pattern of Hưng Yên-linked promotions, further consolidates the province’s growing political clout within the central apparatus — and positions Ngọc as one of the most influential figures to watch ahead of the 14th National Party Congress in January 2026.
Revised Cybersecurity Law in Việt Nam Proposes Stricter Oversight and Higher Compliance Costs
The Vietnamese government on Oct. 31 presented the draft amended Cybersecurity Law to the 15th National Assembly’s 10th session, proposing significant new measures that would expand state control over online activity and impose higher financial obligations on public and private entities.
Two key provisions stand out in the draft.
Under Article 50, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) would be authorized to establish a mechanism for managing and identifying Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and verifying digital account registration information.
An IP address functions like a digital home address, allowing data exchange between devices. With this authority, the police can trace users’ online activities by identifying the location, time, and subscriber behind each IP — effectively treating digital activity like a residence record subject to official tracking.
The ministry would also have the power to require telecommunication and internet service providers to remove information deemed to violate cybersecurity laws from their platforms and systems.
Another notable clause, Article 53, introduces a mandatory budget allocation for cybersecurity protection: at least 10% of the total funding for any information technology project or program must be dedicated to cybersecurity.
During the session, the National Defense, Security, and Foreign Affairs Committee urged the ministry to reconsider the feasibility of this proposal, citing concerns that the requirement could place an excessive financial burden on state agencies and private firms.
The original 2018 Cybersecurity Law — already one of the most restrictive digital regulations in Southeast Asia — has long drawn criticism from rights groups and independent observers, who view it as a tool for surveillance and control over online speech under the banner of national security.
If the amended law passes in its current form, it could further tighten state oversight of internet activity and formalize new mechanisms for identifying and monitoring users in Việt Nam’s increasingly regulated digital landscape.
Berlin Court Narrows Vingroup Claims Against Journalist Lê Trung Khoa, Leaving Most Speech Intact
A Berlin regional court ruling on Nov. 4, 2025, in the civil case brought by Vingroup founder Phạm Nhật Vượng and VinFast Germany GmbH against exile journalist Lê Trung Khoa held that Khoa must not repeat a specific, unproven allegation that VinFast (or its agents) offered journalists money to take down critical reporting. Violations would trigger penalties of up to €250,000 ($289,236) or detention, according to reporting on the court’s order.
Crucially, the court treated several other contested statements as permissible opinion, rejecting broader efforts to enjoin Khoa’s critical characterizations of Vingroup/VinFast. German coverage notes that comments likening the company to a “mafia-like” network, or voicing fears of retaliation, fell within protected expression.
Costs were apportioned largely against the plaintiffs: an analysis citing the written judgment says Vượng must pay one-half of costs, VinFast Germany three-eighths, and Khoa one-eighth; the decision is immediately enforceable but appealable. (Case ref. reported as 27 O 329/25 eV.)
The proceeding arose from Vingroup’s wider legal campaign against Vietnamese-language critics at home and abroad. Berlin media framed the case as a press-freedom bellwether, noting Khoa’s years under police protection and recurring platform takedowns and cyberattacks targeting his outlet, Thoibao.de.
Vietnamese business and state-aligned outlets, by contrast, emphasized the injunction and described the outcome as a Vingroup/VinFast “win,” highlighting the ban on repeating the bribery claim and the potential fine or jail term if Khoa violates the order. This starkly different narrative underscores how the same German ruling is being presented divergently to domestic audiences.
The Berlin court’s approach—blocking a single unsubstantiated factual claim while allowing wide latitude for opinion—tracks Germany’s speech jurisprudence and sets a useful precedent for Vietnamese-language journalism in Europe.
It also tests the limits of transnational “lawfare”: efforts by powerful corporations to use foreign courts to constrain critical reporting. Press-freedom advocates in Germany have recently warned about the rising use of legal tools to chill speech, a pattern mirrored in this case.
The plaintiffs can appeal once the court’s reasoning is fully issued; Khoa remains bound by the injunction on the bribery allegation. Meanwhile, coverage in German outlets indicates that most censorship demands were dismissed, suggesting future attempts to broadly muzzle Vietnamese-language reporting in Germany will face a high bar.
Quick Takes:
Vietnamese civil society sources reported that Facebook user Nguyễn Văn Nghiêm, known online as “Giáo sư hớt tóc”(“The Barber Professor”), was released on Nov. 5, 2025, marking the end of his six-year prison term. Nghiêm was arrested in November 2019 and convicted under Article 117 of the Criminal Code for posts criticizing the government, receiving a six-year sentence. Rights monitors say his case exemplified the criminalization of peaceful expression in Việt Nam. His reported release aligns with the original sentencing term, though no official announcement has been issued by state media or confirmed by major human-rights organizations to date.
Typhoon Kalmaegi Leaves Trail of Destruction Across Central Việt Nam
Typhoon Kalmaegi slammed into Việt Nam’s central region on Nov. 6, killing at least five people and injuring several others, according to the national disaster agency. The storm tore roofs off nearly 2,600 homes, toppled trees, and disrupted power to more than 1.3 million residents across provinces including Gia Lai, Đắk Lắk, and Quảng Ngãi. Rail lines and local infrastructure sustained heavy damage as strong winds and torrential rain swept inland. Kalmaegi, which had already devastated parts of the Philippines, weakened by Nov. 7 but left widespread flooding and economic losses, underscoring the growing vulnerability of Việt Nam’s coastal and highland communities to extreme weather.
U.S. Pledges $130 Million and Military Equipment to Việt Nam During Defense Chief’s Visit
U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited Hà Nội on Nov. 2, announcing a new $130 million commitment to support dioxin cleanup at Biên Hòa Airport, raising total U.S. aid for the project to $430 million. Hegseth also confirmed the handover of three coast guard vessels to Việt Nam and delivery of five out of twelve T-6C Texan II trainer aircraft ordered by Hà Nội. The visit underscored Washington’s deepening defense ties with Việt Nam amid growing regional security cooperation, though the U.S. did not disclose details of value of the weapons sale or broader arms arrangements.
Radio Free Asia Shuts Down After U.S. Funding Cuts
Radio Free Asia (RFA) officially ceased operations at the end of October 2025, citing severe funding shortages. Its Facebook page with 2.5 million followers announced the closure on Oct. 29. Editor-in-Chief Rosa Hwang said RFA could resume broadcasting if new funding is approved by the U.S. Congress. The shutdown follows President Donald Trump’s March 14 executive order, which eliminated seven federal agencies, including the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) — RFA’s parent body. Since May 2025, RFA had already shuttered multiple language services, marking a major setback for independent news coverage of Asia, including Việt Nam.
Việt Nam and the U.K. Sign Agreement to Combat Illegal Migration
During General Secretary Tô Lâm’s visit to the United Kingdom from Oct. 28–30, Việt Nam and the U.K. signed a new agreement aimed at preventing illegal migration. Under the deal, both sides will share biometric data and administrative records to trace and repatriate Vietnamese nationals residing unlawfully in the U.K. Việt Nam remains among the countries with the highest number of irregular migrants entering Britain. The issue drew global attention in 2019, when 39 Vietnamese migrants were found dead inside a refrigerated container truck in Essex, near London — a tragedy that continues to shape bilateral migration policy.
Trump’s $1.5 B Resort in Vietnam Remains Banana Fields after Launch
A glitzy groundbreaking ceremony held in May launched the Trump Organization’s $1.5 billion resort project in Hưng Yên Province, Việt Nam. Five months later, construction has barely begun — the site remains “fields of banana and orange trees.” The project has been stalled by a compensation dispute involving local farmers, The Daily Beast reported. Authorities promised land clearance would be completed by year-end, but mandatory consultations and delayed payments will continue to hamper progress.