When President Xi Jinping commissioned the Fujian on November 5, China became only the second nation to have an aircraft carrier with an electromagnetic catapult system. It is also notable that, last month, two navy aircraft from the USS Nimitz crashed into the South China Sea.
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These events crystallise a strategic reality often obscured by aggregate force comparisons: the relevant naval balance is not between the 11 US aircraft carriers and China’s three, but between what the United States can deploy to the Western Pacific and what China can concentrate in its near seas.
The question is whether American forces can sustain a presence in a potential Taiwan or South China Sea contingency – and whether the US retains the capability and political will to fight a full-scale conventional war after two decades focused on counter-insurgency. Maritime deterrence increasingly depends not on aggregate tonnage but on battle readiness, operational tempo sustainability and the ability to swiftly concentrate force at flashpoints.
The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, responsible for the Western Pacific, typically bases one carrier strike group in Japan. Deploying more in a surge of US force could take weeks and would create vulnerabilities elsewhere. Meanwhile, significant US resources are being directed towards the Caribbean.
China faces no such constraints. Both its Shandong and Fujian carriers are at the Yulin naval base in Hainan, under the Southern Theatre Command, facing the South China Sea. China can concentrate its entire carrier force within days while operating from home ports with extensive land-based air support.
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Between what the US can sustain in theatre vs what China can concentrate near its shores, the calculation increasingly favours Beijing.