Japan’s former top uniformed military officer has called for establishing three “red lines” in strategic competition with China, including maintaining defenses along the first island chain in the western Pacific.
Yoshihide Yoshida, president of Japan’s National Defense Academy, outlined the three priorities at the 13th Mt. Fuji Dialogue, an annual U.S.–Japan policy forum that was held in Tokyo on Oct. 24. They are the first island chain connecting Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines; effective nuclear deterrence; and maintaining the West’s technological advantage, according to Nikkei, a Japanese financial newspaper.
Yoshida served as chief of the joint staff, Japan’s highest ranking uniformed military position, before retiring from the Self-Defense Forces in August 2025. He became president of the National Defense Academy, which educates future Japanese military officers, in April.
In a video message to the forum, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi pledged to strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, also addressing the forum by video, urged closer coordination between Japan’s planned security-policy revisions and Washington’s efforts to strengthen deterrence along the first island chain, according to Nikkei.
The Pentagon’s January 2026 National Defense Strategy calls for a strong defense along the first island chain to prevent China from dominating the United States or its allies in the region. It also calls for greater contributions from American allies and partners.
Japan plans to revise its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program this year.
US Military Role in the First Island Chain
The first island chain runs through Japan’s southwestern islands, Taiwan and the Philippines, forming a series of islands between China’s coast and the wider Pacific Ocean. Chinese military forces moving into the western Pacific must operate through or around this island chain, making it important to U.S. and allied defenses.
Taiwan lies between Japan’s southwestern islands and the Philippines. Beijing claims the self-governing island as Chinese territory and has not ruled out using force to bring it under its control.
Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper warns about China’s military buildup and operations in the East and South China Seas. It also cites Chinese aircraft carrier operations in the Pacific and the regime’s attempts to change the status quo around the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
Yoshida said continued U.S. military involvement along the first island chain was essential.
Nuclear Deterrence and Technological Competition
Yoshida’s second red line is maintaining effective nuclear deterrence as Beijing expands its nuclear arsenal.
Japan does not possess nuclear weapons and relies on American nuclear forces as part of the U.S. security guarantee.
At a Feb. 18 meeting in Washington, U.S. and Japanese officials reaffirmed America’s commitment to defending Japan with its full range of defense capabilities, including nuclear weapons.
The two governments also discussed China’s nuclear weapons buildup and emphasized the role of American nuclear forces and Japan’s conventional military capabilities in deterring aggression.
Yoshida’s third red line is maintaining the West’s edge in advanced technology. Yoshida cited artificial intelligence as one area of strategic competition with Beijing.
In an earlier published dialogue with defense analyst Masashi Murano, Yoshida identified artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and space technologies as increasingly important to modern warfare. He argued that Japan should advance defense innovation and contribute to technological competition between the United States and China.
At the Mt. Fuji Dialogue, Yoshida also argued that Japan should not allow its strategic position to depend solely on relations between Washington and Beijing. He called for Tokyo to cooperate with the United States while taking a more active role in shaping its own security.
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