Speed Over Substance: Who is Really Writing the Laws?

Developments in the National Assembly and legislative activities over the past year have revealed a growing pattern of “lightning-speed” lawmaking. [1] This raises a troubling question for many observers: Has the National Assembly truly been forced into a passive position, as Chairman Mẫn claims, or is this a deliberately engineered process tied to vested interests?

Are Vested Interests at Play?

Laws are enacted to shape the functioning of society. While it is natural for outdated regulations to give way to new ones as circumstances shift, the current legislative processes have become so rapid that the public rarely witnesses normal lawmaking speeds. This inevitably raises doubts about whether specific intentions or schemes are embedded within these processes.

“Vested interests” in lawmaking occur when the invisible hand of a group – whether individuals, organizations, or businesses – bends policy formulation to produce rules that benefit them rather than the public interest. This phenomenon often emerges alongside abuses of power, lobbying, or policy corruption.

It is true that inserting vested interests into legislation occurs even in democracies with advanced legal systems. [2] However, regardless of international comparisons, one basic principle remains: Where there is wrongdoing, it must be corrected. In Việt Nam, this phenomenon has long existed as a form of chronic misconduct that has generated considerable public frustration.

Why are Vested Interests Easily Embedded in Việt Nam’s Lawmaking Process?

The ease with which vested interests penetrate Việt Nam’s legal system stems from the executive branch’s monopolistic grip on the legislative process. The current structure allows the executive to draft laws for National Assembly approval and subsequently use regulatory power to issue detailed implementation guidelines. By controlling both rule-making and rule-interpreting, the executive secures ample opportunity to pursue specific interests.

Naturally, legislators are not so unsophisticated as to openly display any favoritism in the texts they draft. Yet, it is still possible to conceal such intentions by drafting “framework laws” with broad, interlinked provisions and the familiar command: “The Government shall stipulate detailed implementation of this law.”

This functions as an extended arm of the executive branch, opening a gateway for codifying whatever interests they aim to protect. In the end, a closer look reveals that the general law passed by the National Assembly is not what directly governs the legal behavior of subjects in society.

Instead, behavior is governed by instruments hidden behind the façade of “decrees” and “circulars.” Regulatory power becomes the true mechanism that expands the law, transforming these sub-law documents into concrete rules with direct influence over public life.

To illustrate this, consider the silver pheasant case. [3] Government Decree No. 136/2025 authorized the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to list endangered species. Consequently, the ministry used Circular 27 to downgrade the silver pheasant from Group IB to Group IIB. [4]

This regulatory shift altered the legal basis for criminal charges under the 2015 Criminal Code, reducing the offense from Article 244 (endangered species violation) to the lighter Article 234 (wildlife protection violation).

Similarly, Decree 168/2024/NĐ-CP was crafted with expedited speed and no urgent context, subjecting the public to sudden, excessive fines and worsening traffic congestion. [5] In both instances, the sub-law decree, rather than the primary legislation (Law on Handling Administrative Violations), was the decisive factor affecting society.

Vested interests in the law often reveal themselves through five key indicators:

• Provisions that favor a certain group, granting monopoly advantages to specific businesses while restricting market access for smaller enterprises and preserving privileges for elites.
• Embedding restrictive or unreasonable requirements that narrow opportunities for others or impede citizens’ access to rights.
• Limiting transparency and oversight; exploiting vague rules to avoid accountability, thereby weakening the supervisory role of agencies, the press, and civil society.
• Deliberately creating legal loopholes or ambiguous regulations that allow discretionary interpretation for the benefit of certain interests.
• Designing rules that prioritize groups with strong economic or political influence while increasing burdens or disadvantages on workers, consumers, and smaller businesses.

Of these, restricting oversight is the most critical precursor. Since vested interests cannot be blatantly stated – declarations such as “Enterprise A has the right to X” are simply not an option – they must be concealed within provisions that subtly disadvantage one party to favor another.

Despite cultural differences, legal systems globally strive for shared values:

1. Constitutional Supremacy: Ensuring all legal documents and government actions comply strictly with the constitution. This is articulated in Germany’s Rechtsstaat doctrine, which stresses the necessity of constitutional adherence as the foundation of a rule-of-law state. [6] 
2. Transparency: Enabling the public to access and understand legal rules, thereby strengthening citizens’ trust in the legal system and fair enforcement by the state. [7] 
3. Legal Certainty and Consistency: Minimizing contradictions or overlaps among legal documents, ensuring lower-level regulations align with higher-level laws. 
4. Adaptability: Ensuring the law keeps pace with societal rhythms, technological developments, and economic conditions. [8]

The National Assembly’s function is to protect these values. It serves as an internal control mechanism, ensuring that laws are constitutional, consistent, and free from the type of conflicts seen in the silver pheasant case, where circulars overrode decrees.

However, this oversight requires time, effort, and meticulous scrutiny. When the National Assembly is forced into a “rushed mode,” sacrificing quality for speed, it becomes impossible to conduct research or gather public critique.

Consequently, laws pass smoothly, but citizens struggle to adapt. Society is left to spend years correcting the consequences of a hurried vote, often with nothing to show for it but the familiar refrain: “lessons learned.”

The Illusion of Necessity

The creation of a law at lightning speed inevitably forces the question: Is there an objective, urgent need for it? If no such need exists, a subjective motive among legislators is undoubtedly at play.

Take Decree 168/2024 on traffic regulations, which was justified by the lofty goal of reducing accidents. To verify this necessity, the data must be examined. 

From these figures, several observations can be made:

1. In 2019, traffic accidents decreased across all three key indicators compared to the previous year: total accidents fell by 5.06%, deaths by 7.15%, and injuries by 6.42%. 
2. The trend continued in 2020, with significant drops of 17.66% in accidents (3,111 fewer cases), 12.12% in deaths (924 fewer), and 20.7% in injuries (2,820 fewer).
3. While figures hovered around 11,400 during the 2021–2022 COVID-19 restrictions, the number of accidents shot up to 22,067 cases in 2023. Again, while Decree 168/2024 was born out of necessity to address the sudden surge in traffic accidents post-pandemic, the 2024 reduction (from 22,067 to 21,532) is statistically insignificant to justify the effectiveness of the new decree, not to mention there are statistics missing from December.
4. Out of 21,532 accidents nationwide in 2024, only 3,065 were caused by driving in the wrong lane, 360 by running red lights, and 143 by driving against traffic—the violations emphasized in the decree. 

In summary, Decree 168/2024 was rushed into effect with little consideration to address the root causes of the surge in post-pandemic traffic accidents. It was, instead, focused on the penalty fines for common minor violations.

This reveals a legal document that is inflexible; it was ill-suited to the social context and imposed penalties disproportionate to Việt Nam’s economic reality, heavily burdening the poor.

The sudden appearance of this decree suggests that vested interests—disguised as public service—were embedded within it, leading to a chilling conclusion: Laws that appear at breakneck speed are rarely the result of rushed deliberation. They are the products of careful, long-term preparation by someone other than the lawmakers.

---

Đan Thanh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Nov. 21, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.