By December 1, Russia is likely to approve and present its long-term road map for developing its rare earth sector, following President Vladimir Putin’s directive to the cabinet on November 4.
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On the surface, this is a domestic industrial policy story about catching up in the hi-tech arena. However, this view misses the woods for the trees. This road map is a sophisticated geostrategic manoeuvre, a single stone aimed at three strategic birds: reclaiming autonomy over strategic resources, fracturing Western resolve and recalibrating Moscow’s lopsided partnership with Beijing.
The first target is Russia’s own vulnerability. For a nation that styles itself as a great power, its position in the global rare earth supply chain is embarrassingly weak. The US Geological Survey estimates that Russia sits on the world’s fifth-largest reserves, a massive 3.8 million tonnes of rare earth oxides. Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources claims significantly higher figures, a reserve of 15 types of rare earth metals totalling 28.7 million tonnes.
Yet, it only produces about 2,500 tonnes annually, less than 1 per cent of global supply. Its entire production hinges on a single operation: the Lovozero mine on the Kola Peninsula, whose ore is processed at the Solikamsk magnesium plant in the Urals. This is a classic case of the resource curse for the technological age, owning the treasure but lacking the tools to unlock its full value.
Russia’s ambition to catapult itself into being a leading global producer is a direct assault on this paradox. The recent state-orchestrated takeover of the colossal Tomtor deposit – one of the world’s richest niobium and rare earth fields – by oil giant Rosneft signals the Kremlin’s intent to treat this as an urgent matter of national security.
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For a heavily sanctioned country, self-sufficiency in minerals critical for everything from missiles to electric vehicles is not just an economic goal; it is an imperative for strategic sovereignty and a path out of marginalisation.