On Sept. 28, 2025, Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of Russia’s State Duma, stepped onto the tarmac at Nội Bài International Airport as Hà Nội’s monsoon rains gave way to clear skies. Welcomed by National Assembly Vice Chairman Vũ Hồng Thanh and Russian Ambassador to Hà Nội Gennady Bezdetko, his two-day visit carried a subtle but significant weight.
Invited by National Assembly Chairman Trần Thanh Mẫn to co-chair the fourth Vietnam-Russia Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee meeting, Volodin’s trip unfolded against a volatile 2025: the third year of the Ukraine War, U.S. President Donald Trump’s escalated tariffs, doubling penalties on Russian oil buyers like India, and Việt Nam’s delicate balancing of historic loyalties with burgeoning Western and regional ties.
Far from the pomp of state summits, this parliamentary exchange revealed the mechanics of Hà Nội’s “bamboo diplomacy,” a strategy of flexibility and resilience adopted by smaller nations towards bigger ones, rooted in strategic and economic interests. Volodin’s itinerary wove together symbolism and substance.
He laid wreaths at Hồ Chí Minh’s Mausoleum and the Heroes and Martyrs Monument, paying homage to shared history, then toured the Vietnam Military History Museum, where Soviet advisors’ contributions to the 1975 victory are enshrined, and the Việt Nam-Russia Tropical Center, a joint research hub producing drought-resistant rice strains.
These visits marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties, celebrated with fireworks in Moscow and Hà Nội in January 2025.
Beyond ceremony, Volodin’s talks with Trần Thanh Mẫn advanced agreements on energy cooperation and educational exchanges, signaling Russia’s pivot to Asia amid Western isolation and Việt Nam’s calculated navigation of global pressures.
The visit, following Party General Secretary Tô Lâm’s May 2025 trip to Moscow for Russia’s Victory Day parade, underscored Hà Nội’s ability to maintain old friendships while forging new ones.
Bamboo diplomacy, a term coined by the late Party General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng, defines Việt Nam’s approach of bending with the geopolitical winds without compromising its core interests.
Hà Nội abstained from five UN General Assembly votes condemning Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, preserving historic bonds, while at the same time securing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States during President Joe Biden’s 2023 visit.
Russia remains Việt Nam’s top arms supplier, providing 80% of its military hardware, yet Hà Nội has accepted U.S. Coast Guard cutters to patrol the South China Sea, a region contested by China.
The Việt Nam-Russia relationship traces back to Jan. 30, 1950, when the Soviet Union, defying colonial France, became the first major power to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Hồ Chí Minh, trained in Moscow’s Comintern schools in the 1920s, funneled Soviet aid, equivalent to $10 billion in today’s dollars, into anti-colonial resistance. During the American War, Soviet MiG trainers and surface-to-air missiles shifted the battlefield; the 1979 Treaty of Friendship formalized defense commitments.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Russia inherited 90% of those arms contracts, especially supplying Su-30 fighter jets and Kilo-class submarines that bolstered Việt Nam’s naval presence against Chinese encroachments in the South China Sea.
The 2001 Strategic Partnership, upgraded to Comprehensive in 2012, spawned over 100 agreements spanning oil exploration, nuclear training, and cultural exchanges. President Vladimir Putin’s 2024 Hà Nội visit cemented a nuclear cooperation deal between Russia’s Rosatom and Việt Nam’s EVN power utility.
This history, rooted in ideological solidarity but evolving into mutual utility, gives Russia a reliable Asian foothold and Việt Nam a strategic counterweight to Beijing.
Yet the ongoing Ukraine conflict is testing this resilience, with sanctions disrupting spare parts for Việt Nam’s Soviet-era military equipment. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine thrust Việt Nam onto a diplomatic tightrope.
Invoking UNCLOS principles it champions in South China Sea disputes, Hà Nội called for restraint but abstained from UN resolutions condemning Russia, citing their “traditional friendship.” This neutrality frustrated Washington, which imposed 20% tariffs on Vietnamese steel in 2023 over alleged rerouting of Russian goods, but refrained from broader penalties to court Hà Nội as a counter to China.
Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT financial system in 2022 halved Việt Nam fertilizer imports in 2023, driving up rice prices and impacting farmers. To recover, Hà Nội and Moscow developed alternative trade routes, including a Hà Nội-Moscow rail link via TransContainer and expanded Vladivostok shipping, though these increased costs.
Việt Nam adopted some EU sanctions, such as banning Russian aircraft overflights, to avoid secondary penalties from Western partners. The Ukraine war also amplifies Việt Nam’s concerns about China. Russia’s deepening ties with Beijing, including joint naval exercises near Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone, raise fears of a Sino-Russian axis challenging Hà Nội’s claims in the Spratly Islands, where Russian firm Zarubezhneft operates under Vietnamese licenses.
During his Sept. 28 meeting with Volodin, Trần Thanh Mẫn emphasized its traditional friendship and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia, signaling Việt Nam’s commitment to the EU’s EVFTA, which boosted exports by 15% in 2024, and ASEAN’s 2021-2025 Russia cooperation plan for diversified security.
The U.S., with its 2023 partnership upgrade, provides economic ballast: Biden’s $2 billion pledge for Việt Nam’s semiconductor industry outshines Russia’s sanctioned technology sector. Trump’s 2025 tariff hikes on India, a fellow Russian oil buyer, signal risks for Việt Nam, which rerouted $5 billion in Russian oil through third parties last year, according to AP reports.
Economic ties remain a cornerstone of the Việt Nam-Russia relationship. Bilateral trade reached $4.59 billion in 2024, a 26% increase from 2023, with Việt Nam exporting textiles and smartphones while impor ting wheat and machinery. Despite the sanctions, both nations aim for $10 billion in trade by the end of 2025, driven by extensions of the EAEU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.
During their September talks, Volodin and Trần Thanh Mẫn pledged visa waivers to boost tourism, with Russian visitors to Việt Nam doubling to 500,000 in 2024, contributing $1 billion to the economy. Energy cooperation is also related to the visit: Rusvietpetro, a joint venture between Petrovietnam and Zarubezhneft in Siberia, generated $500 million in profits in 2024, enabling arms purchases without relying on SWIFT.
A January 2025 agreement between Rosatom and EVN exports small modular nuclear reactors to support Việt Nam’s 2030 carbon neutrality goals. Renewable energy offers new horizons: Zarubezhneft has bid for a 1,000 MW offshore wind project in Bình Thuận Province.
Sanctions have increased shipping costs by 30%, according to Hà Nội exporters. However, opportunities in IT and agricultural technology persist, with Russia’s 199 investment projects in Việt Nam, valued at $1 billion, ranking 26th among foreign investors.
Defense cooperation remains Russia’s strongest card, supplying 80% of Việt Nam’s military arsenal, including six Kilo-class submarines and 36 Su-30 fighter jets that proved critical during the 2014 oil rig standoff with China.
A defense plan for 2026-2030, signed during Tô Lâm’s May 2025 Moscow visit, commits to modernizing Việt Nam’s arsenal despite delays caused by the Ukraine conflict. To evade Western sanctions, Việt Nam employs covert mechanisms: 2024 internal memos, uncovered by the Associated Press, reveal Petrovietnam routing $2 billion in energy profits to settle payments for jets and tanks, bypassing SWIFT restrictions.
On Sept. 15, talks between Vietnamese officials and Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s maritime security aide, explored joint naval patrols, balancing Việt Nam’s acceptance of U.S.-provided Coast Guard cutters.
Energy and defense intertwine in the South China Sea, where Zarubezhneft’s exploration blocks, despite Beijing’s objections, account for 30% of Việt Nam’s offshore oil output.
Volodin’s visit underscores the quiet power of parliamentary diplomacy. Unlike high-stakes summits, legislative exchanges allow lawmakers to ratify agreements, such as the 2025 visa waiver deal, with minimal public scrutiny.
The Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, established in 2018, oversees initiatives like Russia’s 1,000 annual scholarships to Vietnamese students, a 20% increase from 2024, and scientific collaboration through institutes such as the Tropical Centre. For Việt Nam, these parliamentary ties amplify its multilateral influence: Vietnam-Russia parliamentary groups coordinate votes at the Inter-Parliamentary Union, strengthening ASEAN’s stance on Ukraine peace negotiations.
Russia’s soft power endures through cultural initiatives: the 2025 unveiling of a Hồ Chí Minh monument in St. Petersburg drew 10,000 attendees, and 68 Vietnamese troops participated in Moscow’s Victory Day parade, symbolizing reciprocity. These efforts build trust quietly, supporting Hanoi’s flexible strategy, maintaining Russia for strategic depth while leveraging Western markets for economic growth.
As Volodin departed on Sept. 29, after meetings with Tô Lâm and Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, the visit cemented momentum with new energy agreements and plans for a 2026 committee rotation. Both nations aim for $15 billion in trade by 2030, while defense cooperation strengthens Việt Nam’s maritime security.
Russia serves as a hedge against China’s regional ambitions, while Western partnerships, particularly with the U.S. and EU, drive 30% of Vietnam’s GDP through exports. The 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties, celebrated throughout 2025, fuels innovation in nuclear technology and renewable energy, ensuring Hà Nội’s agency in a multipolar world. In striking this balance, Việt Nam reaffirms its place as a nimble yet independent actor, shaping rather than merely enduring the forces of global change.