The plan by the United States to “institutionalise” four Asia-Pacific countries within the Nato framework is likely to hinge on a raft of factors such as the course of the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s continued “aggression” and the coming US presidential election.
Observers also say the move is aimed at ensuring a future American administration cannot easily reverse the arrangement, which is motivated by growing disappointment with other existing US-led alliances such as the Quad.
Last Wednesday, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said in an interview with South Korean news agency Yonhap that the US wanted to “institutionalise” the four Indo-Pacific partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or Nato, as Washington refocuses its attention on the region.
The grouping of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea is commonly referred to as the IP4.
Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at the think tank Rand, said the institutionalisation of IP4-Nato cooperation would depend on the outcome of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, the level of “Chinese assertiveness” in Asia-Pacific, and the US presidential election in November
“If the war ends on Ukraine’s terms, then IP4 would probably have less salience going forward”, but if Russia were to defeat Ukraine or achieve even limited goals, the US and Nato would view IP4 “as part of maintaining what is left of the liberal rules-based international order”, Grossman said.
Whether China would continue to threaten Taiwan and other regional neighbours could be a key factor, Grossman said, noting that if US President Joe Biden were to be reelected, the IP4 was likely to be further institutionalised.
Campbell’s comments came after the IP4 leaders attended last week’s Nato summit for the third year in a row in Washington, during which they issued a joint statement to “strongly condemn the illicit military cooperation” between Russia and North Korea.
The event is widely seen as a big step undertaken by the 75-year-old military alliance of European and North American countries to forge closer ties with its Pacific partners over common security threats.
During his meeting with IP4 officials, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said both sides must work even more closely together “to preserve peace and protect the rules-based international order”.
In the final communique approved by all its 32 members, Nato called China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine and accused Beijing of employing “coercive tactics and efforts to divide the bloc”.
The alliance also reaffirmed that the “Indo-Pacific is important for Nato and promised to continue deepening cooperation with its IP4 partners on shared security concerns involving China, Russia and North Korea”.
In response, China accused Nato of seeking security at the expense of others and told the bloc not to bring the same “chaos” to Asia.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul, said Nato-IP4 cooperation was starting to be institutionalised through regular meetings, coordinated policy statements, and agreements for increasing interoperability.
“US allies in Europe and Asia are looking to do more together because regional threats to international order are increasingly linked,” he added.
Stephen Nagy, professor of politics and international studies at Tokyo’s International Christian University, said the institutionalisation of IP4 into Nato was an attempt by the current US administration to “ensure that a Trump administration cannot walk back [on] this institutional cooperation”.
During Trump’s presidency from 2017 to 2021, his administration adopted isolationism and protectionism and demanded that Japan and South Korea pay more to cover the cost of maintaining American troops in their countries.
Conversely, the IP4 countries were interested in institutionalising cooperation with Nato as they understood through the Ukraine war that conflict in one part of the world cannot be divorced from potential clashes in other regions, Nagy said.
“Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand will continue to invest diplomatic and other resources into institutionalising the IP4 on their own,” Nagy said. Doing so could help create stronger cooperation among these countries in cybersecurity, disinformation, and emerging technology, he added.
On China’s response to the momentum towards Nato-IP4 institutionalisation, Nagy said Beijing was likely to strengthen cooperation with Russia, Iran, North Korea and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, especially in joint military training.
For instance, China and Belarus, which joined the SCO this month, conducted joint military drills last week in Belarus’ southwestern Brest, just 2.8km from the Polish border and 28km from Ukraine.
Institutionalising the IP4 did not mean an “alliance” between the four countries and Nato as the US-Europe bloc was geographically limited by its charter including confining involvement in a conflict on the European continent, Nagy said.
“This means that there is no Indo-Pacific Nato or Asia-Pacific Nato forming, a warning that China often uses as disinformation,” Nagy said.
Geoffrey Miller, an international analyst with the Democracy Project hosted by New Zealand’s Victoria University of Wellington, said the IP4 was motivated and driven by a growing awareness of the limitations of Quad, an alliance comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US.
While Quad enjoyed “great attention” in the early months of the US administration, it had “quickly faded from view”, Miller said. Its progress was hindered by India’s competing priorities, such as the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week, he added.
After the meeting, US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti warned that India-US relations were still “not yet deep enough” to be taken for granted.
The closer IP4-Nato ties were also motivated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s security deal with the Solomon Islands, both in 2022, which “supercharged” already heightened US interest in the Indo-Pacific, Miller said.
“[They] also pushed the traditionally more independent-minded New Zealand and pacifist Japan to re-evaluate their positions,” Miller said, noting that the IP4 was invited to support Nato’s Strategic Concept, which pinpointed China as the alliance’s long-term adversary.
Approved in 2022, the concept reaffirms Nato’s key purpose is to ensure its collective defence based on a comprehensive focus in areas ranging from deterrence to crisis prevention.
Miller noted the IP4 was already “interwoven with Nato” through institutionalisation such as through the Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPPs). Nato’s ITPPs cover plans for comprehensive cooperation between the bloc and each IP4 country over four years.
In the case of New Zealand, the ITPP “studiously avoids any mention of China” due to the country’s “sensitivities towards its biggest trading partner”, Miller said.
Last year, New Zealand’s exports to the Greater China region – its largest market – totalled NZ$20 billion (US$12 billion) while its imports were valued at NZ$17 billion.
Nonetheless, the omission of China in any ITPP was unlikely to prevent a robust response from Beijing, Miller said.
“As cooperation between the IP4 and Nato becomes more concrete, more enduring and more clearly aimed at China, New Zealand and the other IP4 countries will be more likely to feel the sharp end of China’s response,” Miller said.
Ian Hall, international relations professor at Australia’s Griffith University, said Campbell’s suggestion was not surprising as Washington has been pushing for closer cooperation with its allies for some time.
However, the goal towards institutionalisation may only translate into regular meetings between Nato and the IP4 to discuss China and other issues of common concern, Hall said.
“I don’t expect it would involve much more than that.”