We have a broad and deep relationship with both China and the United States. In the year in which Brazil and China are celebrating 50 years of diplomatic ties, we are also celebrating 200 years of ties with the United States.
I believe that the term ‘new cold war’ could give the impression of a rift that, from the Brazilian perspective, we want to avoid solidifying. Although there are dissonant positions between the major global powers, we cannot deny the reality of an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world that requires solutions through multilateral agreements. There are also important points of convergence between China and the US, such as the fight against climate change. Therefore, we must work for peace and common development.
How will Brazil approach this narrative, given the need to maintain relations with China without alienating its partners in North America and Europe?
I don’t think Brazil needs to choose a relationship with one partner to the detriment of another. We will continue a high-level relationship with China without jeopardising our relations with other traditional partners.
You recently completed a visit to China in which you led a large delegation on the occasion of a Cosban summit. Many Brazilian analysts have said that although the commission is the largest bilateral body between Brazil and China, it has been underused by both sides. How do you assess this perception and how does the Brazilian government plan to use Cosban in the coming years? Has any progress been made in institutionalising and making the working groups within the commission more effective?
Cosban was created in 2004 during the first term of President [Luiz Inacio] Lula [da Silva] and has become the most important negotiating mechanism between Brazil and China. In its 20 years of existence, the commission has actively managed and coordinated cooperation between the two countries, ensuring efficiency, a substantial volume of business and continuity in Brazil-China relations.
China is today Brazil’s most important trading partner. Bilateral trade flows increased from US$6.6 billion in 2003 to US$157 billion in 2023. Brazil’s trade surplus with China, which has been the main destination for Brazilian exports since 2009, amounted to US$51.1 billion – more than half of the US$98 billion surplus Brazil achieved in 2023. Cosban has played a fundamental role in strengthening these bilateral relations by promoting high-level dialogue and partnership between the two countries.
Cosban’s structure has been reformed and is constantly being adapted to the priorities jointly established by our authorities, leading to a process of institutionalising bilateral contacts within the mechanism’s framework. The seventh meeting of Cosban was an expression of the commitment by both nations to further deepen our strategic partnership.
We secured 24.6 billion Brazilian real (US$4.4 billion) in loans for infrastructure in Brazil, signed eight intergovernmental instruments and announced important results in government and private-sector agreements in the areas of agriculture, finance, environment and climate change, trade, industry, communications, health, education, culture, outer space, energy, micro and small enterprises, social and rural development, as well as science, technology and innovation.
Among other things, sanitary and quarantine regulations for the quality of Brazilian pecans were approved. This means that Brazil will be able to export pecan nuts to China. We have made progress in opening the Chinese market up for grapes and sesame seeds and announced the next generation of Sino-Brazilian satellites, CBERS-5, which will be geostationary.
We have signed an agreement to promote Brazilian coffee with the largest Chinese coffeehouse chain, Luckin Coffee. This provides for their purchase of about 120 thousand tonnes of Brazilian coffee, worth about US$500 million. The Brazilian Development Bank and the China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund closed a cooperation deal that provides access to up to US$50 billion for infrastructure.
We also renewed our focus on the environment and climate change, reflected in the creation of the 11th Cosban subcommittee dedicated to the environment following President Lula’s visit to Beijing in 2023.
The 11 Cosban subcommittees meet periodically and drive cooperation on a wide range of issues, reflecting the multidimensional nature of the bilateral relationship and producing concrete results. The great added value of Cosban is that it allows us to move forward in a sustainable, albeit gradual, manner based on the stability and mutual trust that the mechanism provides.
Thus, there was a lot of progress and I am confident that we will continue to develop and strengthen our cooperation over the next 50 years.
About these investments and credits you mentioned: you said before that a significant part of the money granted by the Chinese government would be used for the reconstruction of Rio Grande do Sul. Could you explain specifically how the Brazilian government intends to use this money and how you see China being able to cooperate with Brazil more broadly in climate-change mitigation and adaptation strategies? (Note: In April, the state of Rio Grande do Sul was devastated by record rainfall and flooding that resulted in at least 182 deaths, left some 600,000 people homeless and affected the infrastructure of 478 municipalities in what is widely considered the worst climate disaster in Brazil’s history.)
The topic of investment in infrastructure and cooperation in areas affected by extreme events was one of the three subjects chosen by Brazil for the Cosban plenary session. As such, efforts to help Rio Grande do Sul were at the core of those discussions.
I wish to emphasise the sensitivity with which the Chinese government addressed the climate catastrophe that occurred in the south of our country. We received significant gestures of solidarity with the people of Rio Grande do Sul in the early days of the floods.
Part of the loans for the reconstruction of Rio Grande do Sul will come from multilateral development banks of which Brazil and China are members, such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. I hope that with these funds and cooperation with countries like China, we can rebuild the state with a sustainable and resilient infrastructure that integrates adaptation and mitigation to promote sustainable development for all.
The investments will be done in close coordination with the government of Rio Grande do Sul, with the affected communities and with the people of Rio Grande do Sul, based on concrete projects presented by the interested parties to achieve the greatest impact for the people affected by the floods.
Beyond financing, China has expertise in combating floods and other natural disasters that can promote cooperation with Brazilian civil defence. Remember that the partnership between the two countries for the joint-satellite construction programme for remote sensing has been in place since 1988, a collaboration that allows, for example, the monitoring of deforestation and wildfires in both countries.
We have also advanced the dialogue on cooperation for the Brazilian programme for the conversion of degraded pastures into sustainable agricultural and forestry production systems. We want to attract more foreign support for the initiative, as our goal is to add another 40 million hectares (98.8 million acres) of land with high productive potential without cutting down a single tree.
President Lula has stressed that he expects Beijing to take part in a task force to eradicate hunger and poverty. How does Brazil believe China can cooperate in this area and what concrete measures are being taken by both sides to make joint progress?
The G20 task force for the establishment of a global alliance against hunger and poverty was proposed by the Brazilian presidency of the G20 in December last year and has been working intensively in recent months, with a series of technical meetings to define the design of what the global alliance will become.
China is one of the most active and prominent members of the task force and has declared its support for this Brazilian priority proposal from the outset, a proposal that is particularly close to President Lula’s heart.
The task force concluded its activities on July 24, with the holding of a G20 ministerial meeting that endorsed the alliance’s founding documents. We are now formally open to membership from both G20 and non-G20 countries.
Our expectation now is that the global alliance can be formally launched in November during the G20 leaders’ summit. I hope China will become a member of the alliance to strengthen this important initiative and support countries that want to implement national strategies to fight hunger and poverty. These pressing challenges facing humanity have been exacerbated in recent years by climate change, conflict and economic slowdown in many parts of the world.
I believe China can collaborate with the global alliance against hunger and poverty by sharing its extensive knowledge and successful practices in eradicating hunger and poverty. China has made significant progress in the fight against extreme poverty and can contribute with strategies, public policies and technological innovations that can be adapted and implemented in other countries taking part in the alliance. This knowledge-sharing can be done through the so-called policy basket, a set of proven effective policies and tools that will serve as a reference for countries joining the alliance.
Both China and Brazil already promote South-South cooperation and support various initiatives to combat hunger and poverty. The alliance can serve as a platform to pool efforts and resources and strengthen the actions that Brazil, China and other countries may currently be taking in isolation and sometimes in a fragmented manner. We want the alliance to function as a promoter of continuous dialogue and as an instrument to seek synergies to fight together for the right to development and the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty in the world.
Your trip to Beijing coincided with a decision by the Brazilian chamber of foreign trade days earlier to impose additional tariffs on Chinese steel, a move in line with similar decisions weighed by countries like Chile, Mexico and Colombia. Other industries have also sharpened their criticism of alleged unfair competition with Chinese products. How do the Brazilian government and your ministry view this matter and how has this issue been raised in conversations with your Chinese counterparts?
The trade-defence measures taken by Brazil follow national and international standards. Rigorous technical analyses are conducted during investigations to identify unfair trade practices.
The Brazilian investigators acted in accordance with World Trade Organization rules, including China’s protocol of accession to the organisation. In addition, the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services only initiates investigations at the request of interested companies that provide evidence of such practices. I must emphasise that the decisions taken relate to the practices of companies in specific cases and do not imply a stance adopted by the Brazilian government against China.
The technical nature of the trade-defence decisions as well as compliance with rules and the spirit of cooperation between Brazil and China mean that any commercial differences can be resolved practically without harming our bilateral relations. The issue has been discussed openly with the Chinese authorities on the understanding that there will be no political interference in the decisions.
In this context, let me also underscore that we have a trade-defence mechanism within the Cosban subcommittee on economy and trade that allows a regular exchange of information and positions between our authorities on various issues related to this topic.
On trade and industry, topics you handle as a minister, the Brazilian government has complained for decades that the export agenda with China is heavily focused on commodities, an issue pervading China’s relationship with South America in general. How has the Brazilian government worked to add value to its export agenda with China and how receptive has China been? Is it possible to envision a future where the export of Brazilian goods to China is not almost exclusively limited to minerals and soybeans?
Since 1974, bilateral trade has grown by a factor of more than 7,000. Fifty years ago, only 0.24 per cent of Brazilian exports were China-bound, and only 0.02 per cent of Brazilian imports originated from China. In 2023, 30 per cent of Brazilian exports and 21 per cent of Brazilian imports were bound for or originated from China. So, the economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries is constantly evolving.
This remarkable growth reflects the depth and strength of our trade partnership, marked by mutual benefits and significant economic complementarity. At the same time, we must recognise the opportunity to add value and expand the diversification of Brazil’s exports to China.
The soybean, oil and iron-ore complexes have represented about 75 per cent of our sales to China. We recognise the importance of these exports and at the same time are committed to exploring new opportunities for bilateral trade in sectors such as agricultural machinery, processed foods, beverages, cosmetics, fashion products and aviation. It is essential for a greater variety of Brazilian products, brands and services to benefit from opportunities in the Chinese market.
Also, imports from China, while adding competitiveness to Brazilian production, bring challenges. So, in a new and challenging global context, the Brazilian government seeks to ensure the development of a solid and diversified industrial base through the implementation of the so-called new industry Brazil plan.
This neo-industrialisation project aims to rebuild Brazil’s industrial foundations, making the industry more competitive and greener. We want to promote highly sophisticated productive and technological partnerships in fields like semiconductors, bio-innovation, information technology, the digital economy and sustainable energy sources. Brazil has significant comparative environmental advantages, evident in the fact that we have the cleanest energy matrix among major economies.
As I said, the economies of Brazil and China complement each other in many ways, and we have significant Chinese investments in Brazil. The next step would be productive and technological integration, exploring synergies with the possibility of carrying out production stages in Brazil given its competitiveness in clean energy, both for export to China and as a hub for other markets.
China is the fifth-largest investor in Brazil, with a strong presence in the energy, information technology, agribusiness and industrial sectors. There is enormous potential for increasing this flow of investments, especially in sustainability and new technologies.
Finally, President Xi Jinping is expected to travel to Brazil for the G20 summit in November. A state visit to other cities is also expected to take place then, illustrating the importance China attaches to its ties with your country. Did you meet with Xi in Beijing? How did your talks with him go and what does Brazil hope to advance bilaterally when Xi visits?
Yes, I did meet President Xi Jinping during my trip to China. We had a very productive meeting where we were able to discuss important points on the bilateral agenda. We talked about strengthening the global strategic partnership between Brazil and China, focusing on expanding trade and investment flows, exploring new areas of technological and scientific cooperation and the infrastructure sector, as well as joint initiatives in the environmental, social and rural development sectors. We are working together to take the already strong Sino-Brazilian relations to an even higher level.
Therefore, we have high expectations for President Xi’s visit to Brazil at the end of the year. It will be an excellent opportunity to deepen these discussions and implement concrete initiatives that can bring significant benefits to both countries. We hope to make relevant announcements about new projects and investments and open the Chinese market to new Brazilian products, including agribusiness and civil aviation.